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TRIAL AND ERROR IN TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE: LEARNING FROM SOUTH KOREA'S
TRUTH COMMISSIONS
Hun Joon Kim*
INTRODUCTION
Modern South Korean history has been marked by momentous social
and political upheavals: Japanese colonialism (1910-1945); the U.S. mili-
tary occupation (1945-1948); sundry insurgencies, riots, and uprisings
(1946-1948); the war with Communist North Korea (1950-1953); the patri-
archal dictatorship of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960); a short-lived democracy
cut short by a military coup (1960-1961); the military and authoritarian re-
gimes of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979), Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1988), and
Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993); and, finally, the transition to democratization in
1987.1 Remarkably, all of these events occurred within the last one hundred
years, suggesting that modem and contemporary Korean politics, referred to
as a politics of "strong vortex," is characterized by an extremely dynamic
process with multiple political transitions. 2 South Korea has indeed exper-
ienced at least three political transitions from past abusive regimes to de-
mocracy: one from U.S. occupation to self-governance in 1948, one from
war to peacetime governance in 1953, as well as the multiple transitions
embedded in the struggle against state power through insurgencies and pop-
ular uprisings, culminating in the 1987 formal transition to democracy. All
of this tumult has left innumerable cases of civilian deaths, systematic
human rights violations, and immeasurable suffering by the Korean people.
South Korea has launched various transitional justice measures in re-
sponse. Criminal prosecutions, truth commissions and investigatory com-
mittees, and reparation programs have all been in use since the process of
democratization took root in 1987. Of these, truth commissions have been
employed most frequently. With at least ten truth commissions established
to date, South Korea has been a leader in transitional justice initiatives, not
* Senior Research Fellow in the Griffith Asia Institute and the Centre for Govern-
ance and Public Policy, Griffith University. I gratefully acknowledge the detailed edito-
rial review and helpful substantive suggestions of Tara Melish and Mark Nathan. I
would like also to acknowledge the generous financial support of Australian Research
Council grant DE120101026.
1. For Korean names, the surname is written first followed by the given name (e.g.
Park Chung Hee.) Syngman Rhee is an exception since Rhee decided to spell his name
in such a way and he is known by this name in the West.
2. GREGORY HENDERSON, KOREA: POLITICS OF THE VORTEX 5 (1968).
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only in the Asia Pacific region but throughout the world. So far, forty coun-
tries around the globe have created truth commissions, but only four of
them - Chile, Ecuador, Uganda, and Uruguay - have established more than
one official commission.
3
In South Korea, remarkable progress was made in establishing truth
commissions to investigate past human rights abuses under President Kim
Dae Jung (1998-2003), who won a Nobel Peace Prize in 2000, as well as
under President Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008). Such truth commissions have
revealed the systematic and gruesome nature of the abuse of state power in
South Korea, not only during the Korean War and the armed conflicts that
preceded it, but also under the subsequent military and authoritarian re-
gimes. In quite a few cases, official apologies were issued not only by the
head of state, but also by the head of diverse government branches and
agencies such as the military, police, or intelligence services. Official gov-
ernmental records, history textbooks, and major encyclopedia entries now
reflect these initiatives through the incorporation of the commissions' find-
ings. Politicians and public officials are more cautious in their speech and
use terms and vocabularies reflecting a more balanced and neutral under-
standing of what happened in the past.4 Simple denial or ignorant dismissal
of past abuses is no longer a valid response in public discourse.5 Although
the processes have been far from perfect, several victims have cleared them-
selves of past false convictions, restored their previous social and political
status, found the remains of family members, or received a symbolic sub-
sidy for their medical bills. Memorials have been erected and museums
3. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 60-61, 68-69, 243, 251 (2d ed. 2011).
4. An illustrative example took place recently in the course of the 2012 National
Assembly elections. The ruling Saenuri Party withdrew its selection of Lee Young Jo, a
former head of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as a candidate over the con-
troversies triggered by his use in a conference paper of terms like "rebellion" or "re-
volt" when referring to the Gwangju democratic movement and the Jeju 4.3 events. See
Tae-hoon Lee, Ruling party cancels ex-truth commission chief's candidacy, THE KOREA
TIMES, April 13, 2012.. For the original text of Lee's conference paper, see Young Jo
Lee, Commissioning the Past: South Korean Efforts at Truth and Justice after Democ-
ratization, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND BEYOND IN SOUTH KOREA, 2ND ANNUAL
SYMPOSIUM (2010).
5. While individual scholars, local newspapers, associations for victims, and local
activists and research organizations have continuously published reports and carried out
awareness campaigns about the details of civilian massacres and other human rights
violations since 1987, South Korea's truth commissions have played an essential role by
giving an official status to and legitimating the facts of civilian massacres, such that
they can no longer be discredited as mere opinion or anti-government agitation.
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have been filled with remains, documents, art, and sculptures, containing
the collective memory of the dark past.
Despite these successes, research on the truth commission process in
South Korea has lagged noticeably behind that on other country cases.
Apart from a handful of English-language articles and monographs on the
1980 Gwangju massacre and the subsequent reparations program, 6 there are
few English-language articles on other South Korean attempts to deal with
past human rights abuses. 7 Even within the Korean academy, there has not
yet been a thorough study on these issues,' both because the processes are
rather recent and because the massacres remain ideologically controversial
within South Korea due to the continued confrontation with the communist
North.9
At the same time, the truth-seeking process in South Korea has been
neither smooth nor without certain negative side effects that have provided
opponents with ammunition to criticize the work of the commissions. Be-
cause so many initiatives were launched, opponents and supporters alike
have questioned whether all these truth-seeking projects could effectively
6. GI-WOOK SHIN, CONTENTIOUS KWANGJU: THE MAY 18TH UPRISING IN Ko-
REA'S PAST AND PRESENT (2003); In-sup Han, Kwangju and Beyond: Coping with Past
State Atrocities in South Korea, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 998 (2005).
7. For rare exceptions, see generally Kim Dong-Choon, Beneath the Tip of the
Iceberg: Problems in Historical Clarification of the Korean War, 42 KOREA J. 60
(2002) [hereinafter Kim, Tip of Iceberg]; GI-WOOK SHIN, ET AL., RETHINKING HISTORI-
CAL INJUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE
(2007); Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping with Past Wrongs after
Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 579 (2007). In 2010, a special issue of
Critical Asian Studies had six articles on the South Korean transitional justice experi-
ence. Two articles are particularly relevant: Kim Dong-Choon, The Long Road Toward
Truth and Reconciliation: Unwavering Attempts to Achieve Justice in South Korea, 42
CRIT. ASIAN STUDIES 525 (2010) [hereinafter Kim, The Long Road]; Jae-Jung Suh,
Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Confronting War, Colonialism, and Interven-
tion in the Asia Pacific, 42 CRIT. ASIAN STUDIES 503 (2010).
8. For rare exceptions, see DEUK-JUNG KIM, 'PPALGAENGI '-UI TANSAENG:
YEOSUN SAGEON-GUA BANGONG GUKGA-UI HYEONGSEONG [THE BIRTH OF THE
"REDS": THE YEOSUN EVENTS AND THE FORMATION OF ANTICOMMUNIST STATE]
(2009); KIM DONG-CHOON, JEONJAENG-GUA SAHOE [WAR AND SOCIETY] (2000);
JUNG-SEOK SUH, CHO BONG-AM-GUA 19 50-NYEONDAE (HA) [CHO BONG-AM AND
1950s, VOL. 2] (1999); GI-JIN KIM, KKEUTNAJI ANEUN JEONJAENG, GUKMIN BODO
YEONMAENG [UNFINISHED WAR: CIVILIAN MASSACRES DURING THE KOREAN WAR]
(2002).
9. Kim, The Long Road, supra note 7, at 550.
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be carried out with the limited budgetary and human resources available.10
Even proponents of these processes have worried that the multiplicity and
breadth of truth-seeking efforts might cause public fatigue with transitional
justice mechanisms, or precipitate a severe backlash by opponents of these
efforts." Additionally, some special Jaws were too narrow in their scope,
addressing individual incidents rather than a pattern of abuses. 12 At other
times, special acts were passed to investigate historically remote events,
such as the Donghak peasant uprising of 1894, and the mandates of the
various commissions frequently overlapped. Many of the concerns about
backlash were realized in 2008 when President Lee Myung Bak began to
publicly criticize the truth commissions immediately upon assuming office,
giving the conservative wing of contemporary South Korean politics a pow-
erful voice in the transitional justice debate. His administration proposed
slashing the budgets of the myriad commissions, both by merging them and
rejecting their requests for renewal.' 3
By the end of 2011, the major activities of the various truth commis-
sions had reached an effective end, leaving a multitude of policy recom-
mendations behind for implementation by the South Korean state and
broader civil society. Within this context, the purpose of this Article is two-
fold. It is, first, to stimulate further academic study and community debate
on Korean truth commissions by providing a comprehensive descriptive
overview of state violence in Korea over the last hundred years and the
transitional justice initiatives undertaken in response. Part I correspondingly
details the abuses that occurred under four distinct periods: Japanese coloni-
alism, the U.S. occupation, the Korean War, and the subsequent military
and authoritarian regimes. Part II then details the transitional justice initia-
tives that have been undertaken in South Korea to address abuses in each of
10. History law passes, THE CHOSUN ILBO (S. Kor.), May 3, 2005; Does the Re-
gime intend to Rewrite Korea's Modern History Completely?, THE CHOSUN ILBO, Aug.
3, 2004; Jae Jung Kim, Interview with Kim Dong-Choon, MAL, 2006, at 47.
11. Jung-Hee Lee, Determining history's truth, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY (S.
Kor.), Aug. 6, 2004, at 7; Woong Jae Jung, Interview with Kim Dong-Choon, MAL,
2008, at 133.
12. For example, some laws were enacted to address the following individual inci-
dents: abuses in Samcheong detention centers, Nogun-ri shooting incidents, issues re-
lated to persons on special espionage missions to North Korea, discrimination and mass
killing case of peoples with Hansen's disease, and the arrest and illegal detention of
Buddhist monks. For more details, see REPUBLIC OF KOREA TRUTH AND RECONCILIA-
TION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, vol. 1, pt. 1, 13-15
(2010) [hereinafter FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010].
13. Jung, Editorial, Truth and Reconciliation Commission's disappointing end,
THE HANKYOREH (S. Kor.), Dec. 30, 2010.
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these historical periods. By documenting these initiatives, the Article seeks
to draw attention to, and encourage greater study of, the Korean experience
within the broader transitional justice community.
The second purpose of the Article is to advance greater understanding
of the conditions or factors that may facilitate successful implementation of
truth commission recommendations in the South Korea context. To this
end, I compare the experiences of two of South Korea's most prominent
truth commissions: the National Commission for the Investigation of the
Truth about the Jeju April 3 Events ("Jeju Commission") 14 and the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea ("TRCK"). While the
Jeju Commission's recommendations have been very effectively imple-
mented to date, those of the TRCK have received less public attention.
There is concern in this regard that the latter recommendations will not be
taken up effectively. 15 In an effort to identify policy interventions that may
increase the likelihood that the important recommendations in the TRCK's
recently released final report will in fact be put into practice, lessons are
drawn from the Jeju Commission experience. The Article concludes by of-
fering these potential policy lessons with a view to both strengthening the
implementation process in South Korea and offering potential lessons for
other transitional justice initiatives.
It. THE REPRESSIVE PAST
A. Japanese Colonialism
The thirty-five years of Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) were
marked by coercive sociopolitical repression and economic exploitation.
The colonial authorities relied heavily on coercion, terror, and surveillance
to rule the Korean population. 16 For instance, in 1919, immediately after
14. An official English translation of the Jeju Commission's work is found at the
National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Incident, http://
www.jeju43.go.kr/english/. The use of 'incident (sageon)' is a mistranslation since it
reduces the scope and duration of not only the guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency
campaign over seven years but also grave human rights violations. In Korean, sageon
literally means an event which causes social problem and attracts social attention and
does not have an English connotation of a minor or subordinate event. It is most appro-
priate to understand sageon as 'an event' in this context and I use "events" to stress that
the 4.3 events are complex and multifaceted events with a series of human rights
violations.
15. Yun Hyeong Kil & 0 Seong Kwon, Government bodies stall in implementa-
tion of truth and reconciliation recommendations, THE HANKYOREH (S. Kor.), Apr. 15,
2009; Dong Gweon Lee, Unsatisfactory and Slow Follow-up Processes, MAL, 2008.
16. MICHAEL ROBINSON, KOREA'S TWENTIETH-CENTURY ODYSSEY 43 (2007).
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World War I, thirty-three Korean representatives, inspired by the principle
of self-determination articulated by President Woodrow Wilson in his Four-
teen Points speech, declared independence from Japan and the public partic-
ipated in peaceful demonstrations nationwide. 17 Japanese reprisals were
extremely brutal, resulting in 7,500 killed, 15,000 injured, and 45,000 ar-
rested.' 8 In addition, the colonial authorities used an assimilation policy
aimed at effacing Korean national identity and incorporating Koreans as
second-class citizens. 19 In the course of events, Korean collaborators were
widely used to accomplish these ends, appearing as politicians, business-
men, scholars, journalists, religious leaders, writers, and artists. 20 Pro-Japa-
nese historians, for example, invented the idea that the Koreans and the
Japanese share a common ancestry in order to facilitate assimilation and
even to conscript Koreans into the Japanese army.21 Koreans suffered most
gravely after the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, when
their country became a reservoir of manpower and resources for the Japa-
nese military and industry.22 Some 140,000 Korean men and women were
victims of forced labor and thousands of women were forced to work as sex
slaves, known as "comfort women," for the Japanese military during World
War 11.23
B. Under U.S. Occupation
The Japanese abuses suddenly came to an end in 1945 when the Japa-
nese emperor surrendered to the Allied Forces. The U.S. Army arrived and
soon set up a military government, effectively ruling as an occupier until
the establishment of the South Korean government in 1948.24 The occupa-
17. Id. at 47.
18. Id. at 48. Japan, shocked by the magnitude of the movement, adopted a concil-
iatory policy known as "cultural rule" between 1920 and 1930 that allowed cultural
autonomy. Koreans used this brief window of opportunity to promote nationalism by
starting newspapers and studying history, language, and literature. For more details, see
GI-WOOK SHIN, ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN KOREA: GENEALOGY, POLITICS, AND LEGACY
46 (2006).
19. SHIN, at 42-45.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 45.
22. ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 97-98.
23. Id.
24. Bonnie B.C. Oh, Introduction: The Setting, in KOREA UNDER THE AMERICAN
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1954-1948, at 3 (Bonnie B.C. Oh ed., 2002). Immediately
after the liberation, an interim Korean authority, known as the Committee for the Prepa-
ration of Korean Independence, was set up to keep law and order until the establishment
of a new Korean state. This organization later developed into the Korean People's Re-
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tional forces pursued three major policies: first, suppression of grassroots
state-building efforts, revival of the colonial state apparatus, and the filling
of that apparatus with former pro-Japanese officials; second, the banning of
the communist party and suppression of any progressive social movement;
third, the favoring of rightist groups in the course of pursuing important
socioeconomic policies, such as redistribution of land and industries and
delayed and partial land reforms. 2 5 Public distress and frustration with these
policies exploded in two nationwide resistance movements in 1946: the
September strike and the October uprising.2 6
In 1948, two armed uprisings took place in the southern part of the
country: the Jeju 4.3 events and the Yeosu-Suncheon military revolt.27 Both
started as armed protest by communists and ended with the brutal suppres-
sion and mass killing of civilians by the police, military, and rightist youth
groups. 28 First, on April 3, 1948, around 350 communist insurgents attacked
police substations and the offices and residences of rightist political leaders
in Jeju, Korea's largest island and one of South Korea's nine provinces. 29
The armed uprising and responsive counterinsurgency strategy led to a pro-
longed confrontation of guerrilla warfare in the rugged and precipitous re-
gion of Mt. Halla in the Jeju Island, lasting until 1954.30 This warfare
public and People's Committee. However, this interim authority lasted a mere twenty
days until the arrival of the U.S. Army in early September. For more details, see id.
25. Se Kyoon Kim, Minjung Movement in early Liberation years, in MODERN
KOREAN POLITICS 1945-1948, at 74-75 (Research Inst. for Korean Politics, ed., 1993);
Chan-Pyo Park, The American Military Government and the Framework for Democracy
in South Korea, in KOREA UNDER THE AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1945-1948,
(Bonnie B.C. Oh ed., 2002). In the late 1940s, Korean politics was sharply divided
along the line of left-right ideological cleavage. First, the rightists were generally for-
giving to traitors and collaborators during the Japanese colonial rule while the leftists
wanted strict punishment. Second, the rightists were pro-American and anti-Soviet,
while the leftists were the opposite. Third, the rightists were more reluctant to carry out
a revolutionary land reform while the leftists were active and supportive.
26. BRUCE CUMINGS, THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, VOLUME II: THE ROAR-
ING OF THE CATARACT, 1947-1950, at 237 (2004).
27. John Merrill, Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the
Korean War, in CHILD OF CONFLICT: THE KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, 1943-
1953, at 143 (Bruce Cumings ed., 1983). In Korea, major historic events are
remembered by their date of occurrence. For example, the Korean War which broke out
on 25 June 1950 is referred to as 'the 6.25 (War).' Within this tradition, the armed
conflicts in Jeju are commonly referred to as the Jeju 4.3 events.
28. Id.; John Merrill, The Cheju-do Rebellion, 2 J. OF KOREAN STUDIES 139
(1980).
29. JEJU COMMISSION, JEJU SASAM SAGEON JINSANG JOSA BOGOSEO [REPORT OF
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE JEju 4.3 EVENTS], 167 (2003).
30. Id.
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intensified in August 1948 with the creation of the separate Korean govern-
ments. The conflict resulted in an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 deaths, which
corresponded to ten percent of the total population of Jeju Province in
1947.3' Of all the individual cases, eighty percent of civilian deaths were
committed by state agents, while thirteen percent were committed by
insurgents. 32
To make matters worse, the 14th Regiment in Yeosu and Suncheon, in
South Jeolla province, which had been scheduled to depart to Jeju for mili-
tary operation, mutinied in 1948.33 Around 2,000 armed forces under the
leadership of Sergeant Ji Chang-soo revolted and took two cities and sur-
rounding areas for eight days. In the course of operations, the military ar-
rested and detained anyone suspected of being communist insurgents or
their supporters, executing around 2,000 civilians on the spot.
34
C. The Korean War
The Korean War (1950-1953), which pitted communist North Korea
against South Korea backed by the U.S. military, left around 640,000 com-
bat deaths and injuries, and was accompanied by the height of civilian mas-
sacres in South Korean history.35 During the war, nationwide systematic
killings of civilians were committed by all parties to the conflict. For exam-
ple, 700 villagers in Geochang were murdered by the South Korean 9th
Regiment in 1951; 400 refugees were killed in Nogeun-ri by the U.S. 7th
Cavalry Regiment in 1950; and there were numerous cases of mass killings
of civilians committed by the North Korean army in occupied territories
during the war.36 Of these abuses, the violence of the South Korean govern-
ment against its own people in the early phase of the war was the most
appalling, both in its nature and the number of victims. Indeed, in order to
avoid disruption and insurgency in the noncombat zone in the South, the
police and military quickly arrested former communists and anyone sus-
pected of being a communist supporter or even related to a communist.37
From June to August of 1950, at least 300,000 alleged communists and
their supporters were disappeared. 38 Testimonies of survivors and witnesses
31. Id. at 367.
32. Id. at 371.
33. CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 259.
34. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 93 (§ III: Massive Sacrifice of
Civilians).
35. KiM, supra note 8, at 237-38; ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 114.
36. See generally FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12.
37. SUH, supra note 8, at 608
38. Id. at 613.
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confirm that most of them were either executed in unfrequented mountains
and abandoned mines or buried at sea. 39 In addition, many prison inmates
nationwide were summarily executed with the outbreak of the war, and
many alleged civilian communist collaborators in the occupied territories
were also executed by the South Korean government.
4 0
The Syngman Rhee dictatorship was primarily responsible for the ci-
vilian deaths during the Jeju 4.3 events, the Yeosu-Suncheon military re-
volt, and the Korean War. It lasted until 1960, when it was overturned by
student-led demonstrations prompted by electoral fraud and the murder of a
student protestor by the police.4 By means of an illegally adopted constitu-
tional amendment in 1954, Rhee was able to serve three terms of presidency
over twelve years, engaging in an "ultra-anticommunist policy," sup-
pressing basic civil and political rights, censoring opposition, and regarding
any criticism of the regime as a breach of the National Security Act of
1948.42 Communism was the main enemy of the state, and deterring both
internal and external communist threats was the number one policy priority
for Rhee.43 Political opponents like Cho Bong Am, representing the Pro-
gressive Party, were severely punished, and even condemned to death on
the false charge of espionage without due process. 44 Communists were
purged from the police, the military, the Congress, and the public adminis-
tration, and many were executed.4 5 Victim demands to redress past abuses
of state power were completely suppressed, claiming that those killed had
either been communists or aligned with the communists. 46 Under Rhee's
anticommunist regime, any activities or 'disgraceful' pleas against the mili-
tary or police were regarded as acts benefiting the enemy North.
39. For the witness testimonies, see generally KiM, supra note 8.
40. SUH, supra note 8, at 584-90.
41. ROBINSON, supra note 16, 125-27.
42. Id. at 122.
43. After the end of the Korean War in 1953, Syngman Rhee strengthened his
anticommunist stance by referring to it as a myeolgong (defeating communism) policy
rather than a simple bangong (anticommunist) policy. He vehemently opposed the U.S.-
led armistice talks and campaigned for the total defeat of North Korea. With citizens
terrified by their war experience and fearful of further civilian massacres committed by
the government, a perfect environment was in place for enforcing the political legiti-
macy of Rhee's regime.
44. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at § IV, 48-50.
45. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 162-63.
46. Byung-Joon Jung, Attempts to Settle the Past during the April Popular Strug-
gle, 42 KOREA J. 99 (2002).
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D. The Military and Authoritarian Regimes
The stated priority of the new democratic state in 1960 was the protec-
tion of basic civil and political rights and the promotion of human rights. 47
The fledgling democracy nevertheless lasted only a year as public discon-
tent with economic decline and social disorder grew. In May 1961, a group
of military elites headed by General Park Chung Hee staged a coup and
took over the government. Park skillfully maintained his rule over the next
eighteen years (1961-1979) by justifying his 'extraordinary' seizure and ex-
ercise of power on grounds of anticommunism, national security, national-
ism, and economic development. 48 Like Rhee, Park silenced his political
opponents, suppressed farmer and labor union activities to maintain his
'low grain and low wage' policy, and generally terrorized citizens to make
them submit to his dictatorial rule. 49
The Anticommunism Law of 1961, which was more draconian than
the existing National Security Law, declared any criticism or challenge to
the regime to be an act of communism. 50 The logic was simple: any criti-
cism of the South Korean government, which was officially still at war with
the North, would cause social dissension in the South and thus endanger
national security by benefiting the North. 51 Despite the continuous chal-
lenge to his rule by dissidents and political opponents, Korean elites and the
public generally acquiesced in the dictatorship and accepted Park's claims
of political legitimacy. For their part, urban middle class and working class
citizens temporarily acquiesced to the dictatorship for the sake of "the his-
toric modernization mission of the time. '52 Many accepted the govern-
ment's stand that Korean society did not have the luxury of choosing both
economic development and liberal democracy. 53
The support for Park, however, rapidly declined after a constitutional
amendment was passed in 1969 allowing him to run for a third term. After a
close win against Kim Dae Jung, Park staged a self-coup in 1972 by dis-
solving the legislative and judiciary branches and creating an extremely
47. JOHN KIE-CHIANG OH, KOREAN POLITICS: THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRATIZATION
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 44 (1999).
48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 58.
50. WON SOON PARK, GUKGABOANBEOP YEONGU 1: GUKGABOANBEOP
BYEONCHEONSA [A STUDY OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 1] 194 (1994).
51. Id. at 198-99.
52. SHIN, supra note 18, at 103.
53. Jang Jip Choi, Political Cleavages in South Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY KOREA 13-50 (Hagen Koo ed., 1993).
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powerful presidency. 54 Many opposition leaders, students, and social move-
ment activists were arrested, tortured, and disappeared. For instance, promi-
nent political dissidents and opponents like Choi Jong Gil and Jang Jun Ha
were mysteriously found dead (in 1973 and 1975 respectively). In 1973
Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped by the secret service and almost drowned in
the Pacific Ocean.55 Students, intellectuals, workers, and churches started to
vocally oppose Park's rule. The protests started in Busan and Masan, and
were on the brink of exploding into a national uprising. However, these
movements were abruptly brought to an end when Park was assassinated by
his close subordinate in October 1979.56
The brief moment of democracy known as the "Seoul Spring" (Octo-
ber - December 1979) was followed by another military coup, staged by a
clique of army officers led by Generals Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo
in December 1979.57 The generals became presidents in 1980-1988 (Chun)
and 1988-1993 (Roh), pursuing anticommunist, development-oriented, and
authoritarian policies. The most violent challenge to yet another military
rule occurred in 1980 in Gwangju, the capital of South Jeolla province. 58
Student demonstrations against martial law soon turned into a massive stu-
dent-worker-citizen uprising, leading the military to open fire against civil-
ians. Popular desire for democracy was blamed on a few troublemakers
sympathetic to the communist North and was suppressed with brute force,
leaving 5,060 victims, including 154 deaths, 70 disappearances, 3,028 inju-
ries, and 1,628 arrests, tortures, and detentions. 59
Under the Chun regime, numerous national and local media were
closed down and merged for more convenient media control and many re-
porters and journalists, especially those opposed to another military rule,
lost their positions.6° At the same time, a nationwide sweeping arrest of
alleged gangsters and ex-convicts took place in the name of "the purifica-
tion of society." 61 Many innocent civilians were arrested and fell victim to
suspicious deaths, disappearance, torture, and forced labor. Moreover, dis-
appearances of dissidents continued under Chun and Roh and many student
54. OH, supra note 47, at 59-60.
55. Id. at 60.
56. Id. at 73.
57. Id. at 75-76.
58. For more details, see OH, supra note 47, at 80-87.
59. MAY 18 MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, http://www.518.org/ease/menu.es?mid=Al
0304010000 (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
60. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 252-58.
61. Id. at 250-52; UK HEO & TERENCE ROEHRIG, SOUTH KOREA SINCE 1980, at 35
(2010)
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and labor activists were disappeared in the course of their mandatory mili-
tary service.
62
After ruling for seven years, Chun started to pave the way for a long-
term seizure of power by amending the constitution to favor his reelection
and obstruct the united opposition party. 63 The constitutional amendment
and the death of a university student from drowning during torture united
civil society against Chun. 64 Pro-democracy demonstration initiated by stu-
dents and opposition leaders spread to the general public, including work-
ers, farmers, churches, and the urban middle class. Due to the public
pressure, Roh Tae Woo, Chun's proclaimed successor agreed to have direct
presidential elections in June 1987 and Roh himself was elected president in
December 1987. Roh was elected president with 36.6 percent of the total
votes mainly because opposing power was not able to achieve a united can-
didacy in the 1987 presidential election. 65 The opposition vote was split
between Kim Young Sam (28 percent) and Kim Dae Jung (27 percent),
both of whom had strong regional platforms in two historically antagonistic
southern provinces - Gyeongsang and Jeolla. 66 The Roh administration thus
served in a transitional period between authoritarianism and democracy.
Certainly the arrival of institutional democracy, which allowed the free,
fair, and direct election of the president and other key state offices, was an
important change. Despite the formal transition to democracy, however,
South Korean society had not changed much under President Roh. The po-
lice, military, and intelligence agencies were as powerful and obtrusive as
during the Chun regime, and incumbent politicians and public officials
maintained their positions. 67
II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
A. Addressing Abuses Under Japanese Colonialism
With the creation of the Republic of Korea in 1948, a special commis-
sion was instituted to investigate and punish collaborators with Japanese
62. See generally FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 245-348.
63. OH, supra note 47, at 91.
64. SUNHYUK KIM, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN KOREA: THE ROLE OF
CIVIL SOCIETY 91-92 (2000).
65. HEo & ROEHRIG, supra note 61, at 40-41.
66. Id.
67. SI-UK NAM, HANGUK Bosu SERYEOK YEONGU [A STUDY OF CONSERVATIVES
IN KOREA] 471 (2011).
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colonialism and thereby to clear the disgraceful history they had wrought. 6
The commission was composed of ten members headed by Kim Sang Deok,
a respected figure in the national independence movement. The commission
had ten regional offices nationwide, as well as its own enforcement unit,
special prosecutorial office, and special court.69 The special court was
headed by Chief Justice Kim Byung Roh, and consisted of sixteen judges
who had the authority to sentence former collaborators to death for crimes
of treason.7 0 The former collaborators were arrested and investigated by the
commission, then handed over to the prosecutorial office and the court for a
trial. Within four months, the commission arrested 263 suspected collabora-
tors and announced a list of 1,000 more persons for further investigation. 71
However, the commission was doomed to fail because the new govern-
ment of Syngman Rhee was mainly composed of colonial elites who sur-
vived under the protection of the U.S. occupation. 72 President Rhee was the
most vocal opponent of the commission and refused to remove identified
collaborators, such as Roh Deok Sul, an infamous police detective during
the colonial period, from his administration.73 Instead, Rhee and his sup-
porters accused the commission and court members of being communists
who threatened national security by instigating social dissension out of ha-
tred and vengeance.7 4 The members of the commission and judges were
68. Special Act for the Punishment of the Anti-Nation Activities, Act No. 3, art. 1
(1948) (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Anti-Nation Activities Act].
69. For more details, see generally JONG HEO, BANMIN TEUKUI JOJK-GUA
HWALDONG [THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR IN-
VESTIGATION OF THE PRO-JAPANESE COLLABORATORS] (2003); KANG-Soo LEE,
BANMIN TEUKUI YEONGU [A STUDY OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR INVESTIGATION
OF THE PRO-JAPANESE COLLABORATORS] (2003).
70. See Anti-Nation Activities Act, supra note 68, art. 1.
71. HEO, supra note 69, at 211.
72. The U.S. military government declared any grassroots state building efforts
illegal and dissolved the local councils which had been widely created nationwide im-
mediately after the fall of Japan. Then, the U.S. military government revived the three
most hated colonial state apparatuses - police, military, and judicial system - with
former colonial state officials. About 80 percent of the former colonial policemen were
reemployed by the U.S. military government, which was a grave mistake resulting from
expediency. In addition, most positions in the administration were filled with the privi-
leged elites under the colonial rule. The key posts in the central and local administration
were filled with colonial elites who had been educated either in Japan or the United
States. Rhee, who had previously spent most of his lifetime in the United States and did
not have a popular and stable domestic political base, created a strong alliance with the
colonial elites. For more details on the U.S. policy, see PARK, supra note 25.
73. HEO, supra note 69, at 271
74. Id. at 331.
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threatened with assassination, and the police, with the tacit consent of Presi-
dent Rhee, raided the commission, injuring many and destroying docu-
ments.75 The commission gradually withered, and clearing up the past
became one of many ideologically controversial political issues. 76 The spe-
cial act which created the commission went through three degenerative re-
visions and was finally annulled in 1951.77 Within its term, the commission,
prosecutorial office, and court investigated 688 cases, indicted 293, tried
78, and convicted 19, who were all soon released. 78
The pro-Japanese collaborator issue returned to South Korea with the
inauguration of President Roh Moo Hyun in 2003. Tensions with Japan
intensified during this period over the issues of reparations for the victims
of sex slavery and forced labor, a territorial dispute over Dokdo, the slanted
content of Japanese history textbooks, and the Japanese prime minister's
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, where several Japanese war criminals are bur-
ied.79 Another commission was thereby set up in 2005.80 It had eleven mem-
bers, headed by Seong Dae Gyeong, a history professor. The commission
was given an identical mandate to the previous one, but much less power: it
did not have any authority to subpoena witnesses or arrest suspects, and had
no adjudication power.8 1 After four and a half years of investigation, the
final report on 1,006 collaborators was published in 2009, which consisted
of 25 volumes comprising over 21,000 pages.82
At the same time, two other commissions were created to address re-
lated issues of Japanese colonialism. In 2004, a special commission was set
up to investigate the victims of forced labor under Japanese colonial rule.83
The commission, with eleven members headed by Jeon Gi Ho, a professor
75. Id. at 351.
76. Id. at 362-363.
77. LEE, supra note 69, at 319.
78. HEo, supra note 69, at 297-300.
79. Japan and South Korea fail to resolve disputes, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005;
Norimitsu Onishi, Koizumi visit deepens rift over war shrine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2006.
80. The Committee for the Investigation of Anti-Nation Activities under Japanese
Colonialism was established by the Special Act for the Investigation of Anti-Nation
Activities under Japanese Colonialism, Act No. 7203 (2004) (S. Kor.).
81. See id. art. 4.
82. THE COMMITTEES FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ANTI-NATION ACTIVITIES UNDER
THE JAPANESE COLONIALISM, CHINIL BANMINJOK HAENGWI JINSANG GYUMYEONG
BOGOSEO [REPORT OF THE ANTI-NATION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE JAPANESE COLONIAL-
ISM] (2009).
83. The Special Committee for the Investigation of Forced Labor under Japanese
Colonialism was created by the Special Act for the Investigation of Forced Labor under
Japanese Colonialism, Act No. 7174 (S. Kor.) (2004).
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of labor economics specializing in the colonial era, has so far received
142,527 applications and is still working at the time of this writing.8 4 In
2006, another commission was set up to investigate the properties of former
collaborators, specifying that such properties shall be confiscated and re-
verted to state ownership.85 For four years, the commission, with nine mem-
bers headed by Kim Chang Guk, a prominent lawyer, investigated the
properties of 462 collaborators and confiscated the properties of 168 of
them.86
B. Addressing Abuses Under the U.S. Occupation
Because the Jeju and Yeosu-Suncheon events started as communist up-
risings, addressing civilian massacres related to these events was extremely
difficult under anticommunist regimes, especially where the dead and miss-
ing were believed to be either communist insurgents or their supporters.
Victims and their families had to remain silent because any actions to ad-
dress civilian deaths were deemed illegal for over fifty years. However,
mainly due to strong and persistent civil society activism, two commissions
were recently established with mandates to address these events: the Jeju
Commission (2000) and the TRCK (2005). While the former was estab-
lished with an investigative mandate limited to the Jeju events, the later had
a comprehensive mandate covering the entire period between 1910 and
1987, and hence incorporated the events of Yeosu-Suncheon.
The Jeju Commission was established in 2000 to investigate and reveal
the truth, to identify victims, and to restore the honor of the victims of the
Jeju 4.3 events. 87 The special act was enacted in 1999 in order to promote
human rights, consolidate democracy, and contribute to national unity.88 To
achieve these goals, the commission, the administrative subcommittee, the
subcommittee for the report, and a secretariat were set up.89 As the highest
84. For more information in Korean on the commission, see http://www.jiwon.go.
kr/news/news_05_list.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
85. Special Act for the Reversion of the Properties of Pro-Japanese Collaborators,
Act No. 7769 (S.Kor.) (2005).
86. THE COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF PRO-JAPA-
NESE COLLABORATORS, DECISIONS ON THE REVERSION OF THE PRO-JAPANESE COLLABO-
RATORS' PROPERTIES TO THE STATE (2010).
87. The Jeju Commission was established by the Special Act for the Investigation
of the Jeju 4.3 Events and Restoration of the Honor of Victims, Act No. 6117 (2000) (S.
Kor.) [hereinafter Jeju Special Act].
88. See id. art. 1.
89. JEJU COMMISSION, HWAHAE-WA SANGSAENG: JEJU 4.3 WIWEONHOE BAEKSEO
[RECONCILIATION AND COEXISTENCE: THE WHITE PAPER ON THE JEJU COMMISSION] 49
(2008) [hereinafter JEju COMMISSION WHITE PAPER].
2012]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
deliberative body, the commission was headed by the prime minister and
was composed of twenty members, including the governor of Jeju, seven
ministers, and twelve civil society representatives. 90
The administrative subcommittee, headed by the governor of Jeju, was
designed to carry out practical business entrusted by the commission, such
as accepting applications from victims and families, conducting an initial
screening process of victims by reading individual applications and cross-
checking them with resident registration information, and giving financial
and medical support to victims.91 The subcommittee for the report was in
charge of collecting and analyzing domestic and foreign evidence needed to
investigate the Jeju 4.3 events and human rights violations, establishing the
archive, and publishing the report.92 The subcommittee included fifteen
members, composed of five public officials and ten members appointed by
the commission, and oversaw the investigation unit with twenty investiga-
tors, who mainly conducted research and drafted the report.93
The Jeju Commission has worked on three key activities: investiga-
tion, screening of victims, and commemoration projects. 94 The special act
mandated the commission to finish its investigation in two years and to
prepare a report within six months of the end of the investigation. 95 Accord-
ingly, the subcommittee for the report spent two and a half years collecting
10,594 documents and conducting interviews with 503 victim survivors, po-
lice/military personnel, scholars, lawyers, and politicians. 96 The special act
granted the commission the right to request government secret files and to
conduct interviews with victims and relevant witnesses. 97 However, unlike
later truth commissions, which had at least minimal enforcement power, the
Jeju Commission did not even have the power to issue fines. The final draft
was completed in March 2003, but it was published only in December, after
the commission repeatedly revised it in the midst of heated debates over
nine months.
The report documented four categories of human rights violations: ci-
vilian massacres, disappearances, torture cases, and suffering related to
guilt-by-association. 98 It confirmed systematic massacres by the military
90. The ministers were those of justice, defense, public administration and secur-
ity, health, finance, and government legislation.
91. JEJU COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, at 61-65.
92. Id. at 57-59.
93. id.
94. See Jeju Special Act, supra note 87, art. 3.
95. See id. arts. 6, 7.
96. JJU COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 46 -52.
97. See Jeju Special Act, supra note 87, arts. 5, 6.
98. See generally JEjU COMMISSION, supra note 29.
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and police, and found evidence of indiscriminate and sweeping arrests, tor-
ture, illegal detention, and summary executions. 99 It also included the suf-
fering of victims' relatives who received unfair treatment in employment,
promotion, and international travel under the military regimes. 1°° Following
the special act, the Jeju Commission defined victims as "anyone who is
deceased, missing, or injured due to the Jeju 4.3 events between 1947 and
1954."1 1 Between 2000 and 2007, the commission received individual ap-
plications from victims and their relatives seeking to restore the victims'
honor. Victims first submitted their applications to the administrative sub-
committee in Jeju and went through a basic fact-checking process. 102 Then,
applications were transferred to the commission, whose members made a
decision on victimhood in plenary session.' 03 In order to expedite the pro-
cess, the commission created a subcommittee composed of seven members.
The subcommittee went through 68 sessions between 2001 and 2010, set-
ting the criteria for victimhood and applying those criteria to each individ-
ual case.' °4
By March 2011, the commission reported that 15,100 Jeju victims had
been identified, among which 10,729 were killed (71 percent), 3,920 disap-
peared (26 percent), 207 injured (1.4 percent), and 244 imprisoned (1.6 per-
cent).105 The commission also announced 31,255 family members of
victims who had suffered. 10 6 Of all the individual cases, 78.1 percent were
attributed to state agents, such as the police, military, and rightist youth
groups, and 12.6 percent to the insurgents. 107 Most victims were in their
teens and twenties but twelve percent were civilians under ten years old (5.8
percent) or above 60 years old (6.1 percent). 0 8 Victims were 79 percent
99. Id. at 386.
100. Id. at 496-508.
101. Jeju Special Act, supra note 87, art. 2.2.
102. JEJU COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, at 136-37.
103. Id. at 148.
104. Id. at 145-46.
105. For more statistical details on the commission's findings, see http://www.jeju
43.go.kr/sub/catalog.php?CatNo=30 (last visited May 2, 2012).
106. Id.
107. JEJU COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 371. Since August 1947, rightist youth
groups were created in South Korea under the protection of the occupational forces and
rightist politicians. The United Youth (daedong cheongnyeondan) was set up by an-
ticommunist groups in the South; the Northwestern Youth (seobuk cheongnyeondan)
was created by young people from the North escaping from the communists. Members
of the Northwestern Youth arrived in Jeju in order to assist military and police
operation.
108. Id. at 370.
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male and 21 percent female. 109 The combined percentage of children, eld-
erly, and women victims clearly indicates the nature of indiscriminate kill-
ings. Mass killings were concentrated - with 63.4 percent of deaths -
within a five-month period between October 1948 and February 1949 when
the authorities set up headquarters in Jeju and pressed for harsh
suppression.110
The events of the Yeosu-Suncheon revolt, by contrast, were not ad-
dressed until the TRCK decided to investigate them in 2008.1' The TRCK
received individual applications from victims and families of the associated
events and, after investigation of their cases, announced state responsibility
for 1,340 civilian deaths in 2010.112 It nonetheless acknowledged that this
number under-represents the total number of victims since, in many cases,
whole families were exterminated and no one was left to apply for vic-
timhood.113 The commission also reported that although the revolt was suc-
cessfully suppressed within a week, sporadic guerrilla warfare and
counterinsurgency operations continued for another two years until August
1949, causing frequent civilian deaths. 1 4
C. Addressing Civilian Massacres During the Korean War
The first attempt to address civilian massacres during the Korean War
came in 1951 after 700 villagers in Geochang, South Gyeongsang province,
were murdered by the Korean army. 115 Immediately, a special investigation
commission composed of lawmakers and government ministers was set up
and a special military tribunal was opened. 116 As a result, three army of-
ficers were convicted of murder and cover-up, but all of them were
pardoned by President Syngman Rhee during the war and held high posi-
tions in his administration. 17 On the contrary, families of victims could not
even collect the remains of the dead for three-long-years and were con-
stantly under surveillance and threat. Because of the Geochang case, which
109. Id.
110. Id. at 371.
111. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 69.
112. Id. at 93.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 93-94.
115. JUNG-SEOK SEO, CHO BONG-AM-GUA 1950-NYEONDAE (HA) [CHO BONG-AM
AND 1950s, VOL. 2] 683-84 (1999).
116. Id. at 684.
117. Id. at 685.
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set the example, victims of other severe massacres nationwide remained
silent under the Rhee regime.118
The second attempt came immediately after Rhee's resignation in
1960. Families of victims nationwide formed associations to represent their
collective demands and this led to the institution of a special congressional
commission in 1960.119 The commission was composed of nine lawmakers
headed by Congressman Choi Cheon. The purpose of the commission was
to conduct preliminary fact-finding for further legislation. 20 Although ex-
pectations were high among victims and their families, cursory nationwide
investigations ended after two weeks without further development. The fail-
ure of the commission was mainly due to the timing of its institution. Al-
though Syngman Rhee had stepped down, the 4th National Assembly,
created under Rhee in 1958, was still composed of many members who
were directly or indirectly responsible for the massacres.' 2' For example,
Choi, the head of the congressional commission had been the provincial
police director of the most heavily affected areas - Jeju and Gyeongsang -
at the time of war. 122
What is worse, these initial efforts encountered a severe backlash with
the military coup of General Park Chung Hee in 1961. Many who had held
leadership positions in the victims' association were arrested and sentenced
to death or life imprisonment. 123 Any evidence of massacres, such as monu-
ments or mass graves, was systematically destroyed by the military po-
lice. 124 Unaddressed civilian massacres thus gave birth to another kind of
human rights violation: the brutal suppression of victims and their families
by the military government in 1960.125 The coup of Park Chung Hee
marked the beginning of 32 years of consecutive military and authoritarian
regimes, and all discourses or attempts to bring justice to the past atrocities
were completely suppressed.126With the creation of the TRCK in 2005, vic-
118. Id. at 719.
119. Jung, supra note 46, at 104.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. JEJU COMMISION, supra note 29, at 192.
123. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 77-82.
124. Id. at 82.
125. In addition, families and relatives of victims have suffered discrimination
through guilt-by-association or under the involvement system. Under the military and
authoritarian regimes, families of victims were discriminated against in terms of unfair
treatment in employment, promotion, state examinations, or international travels. Kim
Dong-Choon further argues that the victims have also been treated as "second-class
citizens" in Korean society. Kim, Tip of the Iceberg, supra note 7, at 62.
126. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 82.
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tims submitted applications for investigation of such violations and, in
2009, the TRCK confirmed these cases. 127
An important breakthrough came with the inauguration of the first ci-
vilian president, Kim Young Sam, in 1993. President Kim had his constitu-
ency in the Gyeongsang province and promised to investigate and make
reparation to the victims of the Geochang village massacres. 128 In 1997, a
special review committee was set up to investigate the massacres and iden-
tify civilian victims. 129 The committee acknowledged the responsibility of
the military and identified 548 victims and 785 family members. 130 How-
ever, no further actions were taken beyond this investigation except a few
subsequent commemoration projects at the local level.' 3 ' Families of vic-
tims brought a series of lawsuits against the government for monetary com-
pensation, but those lawsuits were ultimately dismissed in 2008 by the
Supreme Court on statute of limitation grounds. 32 In 2004, the National
Assembly passed a special law designed to make individual reparations to
the Geochang victims, but the Prime Minister (an acting president while
President Roh Moo Hyun awaited the Constitutional Court's decision on
the validity of his impeachment) vetoed the bill. The Prime Minister's justi-
fication was that if individual reparations were made to the Geochang vic-
tims, other victims of state violence would soon request reparations and this
would cause "enormous financial burden to the state budget."' 133
Interestingly, although the special act was designed to address other
massacres nationwide, the committee's investigation work did not extend
beyond the Geochang case. 134 This was primarily because victims and fam-
ily members who had been hit hard by the backlash after the coup in 1961
127. Id. at 188.
128. GOECHANG MASSACRE MANAGEMENT OFFICE, GEOCHANG SAGEON CHUMO
GONGWON JOSEONG SAGEON JARYOJIP [THE DOCUMENT ARCHIVE PREPARING THE CRE-
ATION OF THE MEMORIAL PARK OF THE GEOCHANG EVENT] 34 (2005).
129. The Review Committee for Restoring the Honor of Victims of Geochang and
Other Massacres, established by the Act for Restoring the Honor of Victims of Ge-
ochang and Other Massacres, Act. No. 5148 (1996) (S. Kor.).
130. GOECHANG MASSACRE MANAGEMENT OFFICE, supra note 128, at 37. More
details on the Geochang event can be found at the website of the Geochang Massacre
Management Office, http://case.geochang.go.kr.
131. Id. at 38.
132. Victims of "the Geochang Civilian Massacres" lost a lawsuit, THE HANKY-
OREH (S. Kor.), June 5, 2008.
133. PM Koh vetoed the Geochang Special Act, THE HANKYOREH (S. Kor.), Mar.
24, 2004.
134. The title of the special act was Special Act on Restoring the Honor of Vic-
tims of Geochang and Other Massacres, supra note 129.
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were extremely cautious and slow to raise their voices.'35 There was a rea-
son for this hesitancy under the Kim administration: Although elected as
South Korea's first civilian president in 1993, Kim gained power by a
merger of his party with the old ruling party of Roh Tae Woo in 1990. It
thus took another decade for victims and families to create the National
Association of the Bereaved Families of the Korean War in 2000. With
their fervent activism and the support of President Roh Moo Hyun, the
TRCK was created in 2005. (I will examine this commission later in detail.)
D. Addressing Human Rights Violations Under the Authoritarian
Regimes
Two kinds of human rights abuses under the military and authoritarian
regimes drew national attention after democratization in 1987: first, the
massive deaths and injuries of protestors in the 1980 Gwangju democratic
movement; and second, the systematic deaths and disappearance of opposi-
tion leaders and activists. Soon after President Chun stepped down in 1988,
a nationwide focus was given to the 1980 Gwangju massacre for which
Chun Doo Hwan and the then incumbent Roh Tae Woo bore responsibil-
ity.' 36 The first initiative came from President Roh who immediately set up
a presidential advisory commission to promote reconciliation after democ-
ratization. 37 The commission officially admitted that the Gwangju uprising
was a prodemocracy movement, but opposed any form of punishment or
truth-seeking in order to avoid disrupting democratic unity. 138 In response,
lawmakers quickly set up a congressional commission on the Gwangju 5.18
events in June 1988 and held seventeen hearings by summoning sixty-seven
relevant persons including Chun Doo Hwan.139 It was the first time in South
Korean history that a former president was brought into a public hearing
and questioned.
Despite the sensation, the congressional commission suffered innate
limitations. This was partly due to its lack of power to force reluctant perpe-
trators to testify in public, and partly due to the lack of political will of the
incumbent Roh Tae Woo administration and his political party.140 The cases
were not transferred to the courts for further criminal prosecution, and Chun
Doo Hwan retired to a hermitage on the grounds of the Baekdam Temple in
Gangwon province. Nevertheless, in response to the growing national atten-
135. Jung, supra note 46, at 110.
136. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 4.
137. Id. at 4-5.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Cho, supra note 7, at 581.
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tion, the legislature passed an important reparations law in 1990.141 This
marked the first national legislation stipulating governmental reparations to
the victims of state violence. From 1990 to 1998, individual reparations
were made to 4,537 victims (247 deaths, 64 disappearances, 2865 injuries,
and 1,361 arrests or indictments) with a total amount of 210 billion won
(175 million USD). 142
However, demands for truth and justice constantly increased under the
first civilian government of Kim Young Sam, and human rights lawyers and
activists filed several lawsuits against Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and
their subordinates on the charge of murder and other offences. 143 After in-
tensive investigation, the Seoul district prosecutorial office acknowledged
the crime of general murder in the course of suppressing Gwangju protes-
tors in May 1980.144 The office nevertheless decided not to prosecute the
case, claiming that acts of the military coup of December 12, 1979, and the
hard line suppression of protestors were highly political decisions, which
did not fall under its legal jurisdiction. 145
Both elites and the public vehemently protested the decision and, at the
same time, information about hidden assets of Roh Tae Woo was dis-
closed. 146 President Kim Young Sam, who was initially against the criminal
prosecutions of the two former presidents, finally supported the special act,
which removed the statute of limitations and provided an opportunity for
retrial of those who had been convicted in relation to the protest.147 Both
Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, along with fourteen generals, were
arrested and sentenced to death (Chun) and life imprisonment (Roh), but
later pardoned as a token of forgiveness and reconciliation by President
Kim Young Sam, with the consent of the then president-elect Kim Dae
Jung. 148
Another widespread abuse of state power - the deaths and disappear-
ances of students, activists and politicians under the military and authorita-
rian regimes - received attention under President Kim Dae Jung. The
Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths was created in 2000
and served two terms (October 2000-September 2002 and July 2003-August
141. Special Act for Reparations for Persons Concerned with the Gwangju Demo-
cratic Movement, Act No. 4266 (S. Kor.) (1990).
142. MAY 18 MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, supra note 59.
143. Cho, supra note 7, at 581.
144. Id. at 582.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. id. at 583. Special Act Concerning the May 18 Gwangju Democratic Move-
ment, No. 5029 (1995) (S. Kor.).
148. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 5-6.
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2004, respectively). 149 The commission was created to investigate and find
the causes of deaths, suspected to have been carried out directly and indi-
rectly by government agents during the pro-democracy movement under the
pre-1992 military and authoritarian regimes. 50 The special act sought to
consolidate democracy and to contribute to national unity by finding the
causes of suspicious deaths and restoring the victims' honor, especially in
cases where suicide or accidental death was falsely alleged.' 5' The commis-
sion was mandated to investigate individual cases upon request from the
victims' families, to report its findings and policy recommendations to the
president, and to identify perpetrators and report them to the relevant judi-
cial bodies for prosecution. 5 2 In 2002, the commission concluded its first
term, but because many cases were left unresolved, the commission began a
second term in 2003. This time, the term was reduced to one year mainly
because the commission was mandated to investigate only forty-four re-
maining cases. 53
The commission consisted of nine commissioners headed by Yang
Seung Gyu (2000-2002) and Han Sang Beom (2002-2004), both respected
legal scholars. The commissioners, nominated by the president with the
consent of the National Assembly, were all civilians with no apparent party
affiliation in order to achieve neutrality and objectivity in their investiga-
tion. 154 The first-term commission was created with seventy-eight residing
staff members within five departments and ten investigatory teams, but was
149. Special Act on the Investigation of Suspicious Deaths, Act. No. 6170 (2000)
(S. Kor.) [hereinafter Suspicious Deaths Act]. The law was revised three times: Act.
No. 6496 (2001) (S. Kor.), Act. No. 6670 (2002) (S. Kor.), Act. No. 6750 (2002) (S.
Kor.).
150. See Suspicious Deaths Act, supra note 149, art. 2.1. Although the Park
Chung Hee dictatorship started as early as 1961, the Suspicious Deaths Commission
covered only crimes that occurred after August 7, 1969, the date when President Park
amended the constitution to allow him to run for three consecutive terms. Previously,
the constitution allowed a person to hold a maximum of two terms during a lifetime.
151. Id. art. 1.
152. Id. art. 30.
153. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON Suspicious DEATHS, UIMUNSA JINSANG
GYUMYEONG WIWONHOE-EUI HWALDONG-GUA GWEONGO: 2-CHA (2003.7-2004.6)
[THE AcTiVrrES AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON SUS-
PICIOUS DEATHS: SECOND TERM (July 2003-June 2004)] 101-02 (2004) [hereinafter
Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: SECOND TERM].
154. The first-term commission was composed of one public official, five profes-
sors, and three lawyers. The second-term commission was composed of new members,
but its overall composition remained the same in the sense that three commissioners
were lawyers, five were professors and one was a government official.
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expanded in its second term to 101 staff members across thirteen teams.155
Department I investigated suspicious deaths by all other agencies except
the police and military; Department 2 investigated cases related to the po-
lice; Department 3 dealt with cases related to the military; while Depart-
ment 4 consisted of a special investigation unit under the commission
chair.156 The first-term commission had a budget of 11.5 billion won (9.6
million USD), while the second-term commission's budget was 4.5 billion
won (3.8 million USD). 157
Initially, the commission's mandate was limited to six months with a
possible extension for three more months. 158 Later the mandate and terms
were extended because commissioners and lawmakers realized that the
commission needed more time to fulfill its mandate. 159 The commission re-
ceived eighty applications from victims and family members between Octo-
ber 2000 and January 2001 and brought five additional cases to the list.160
Of the cases it investigated, thirty were attributed to the police (Department
2), twenty-eight to the military (Department 3), twelve to other agencies
such as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and Ministry of Justice
(Department 1), and fifteen unspecified (Department 4). 161 Of the eighty-
five suspicious deaths investigated, thirty were determined to have resulted
from state violence, twenty-five were found undeterminable due to a lack of
evidence, thirty-six were rejected, and five were dismissed. 162
During its first term, the commission interviewed 6,536 witnesses and
requested 3,126 documents from relevant government agencies, while it in-
terviewed an additional 3,560 witnesses during its second term. 163 The spe-
cial act gave the commission the rights to interview government officials
and request secret files, but gave only the limited enforcement power to
issue fines not exceeding 10 million won (8,800 USD).164 Consequently it
had to rely on voluntary cooperation from individuals, government
155. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: SECOND TERM, supra note 153, at 103-104;
The Presidential Commission on Suspicious Deaths, Uimunsa Jinsang Gyumyeong
Wiwonhoe Bogoseo: 1-Cha (2000.10-2002.10) [The Report of the Presidential Com-
mission on Suspicious Deaths: First Term (Oct. 2000-Oct. 2007)] 97-98 (2002) [herein-
after Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: FIRST TERM].
156. Id. at 101.
157. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: SECOND TERM, supra note 153, at 94.
158. See Suspicious Deaths Act, supra note 149, art. 30.
159. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: FIRST TERM, supra note 155, at 79.
160. Id. at 136.
161. Id. at 137.
162. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: SECOND TERM, supra note 153, at 107.
163. Id. at 111.
164. Suspicious Deaths Act, supra note 149, art. 37.
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branches and agencies. The National Intelligence Service rejected thirty-
five percent of the commission's requests, while the Defense Security Com-
mand (the military intelligence service) rejected twenty-seven percent. 165
The commission could also issue a warrant to compel witnesses to cooper-
ate in an interview and investigation. 166 During its first term, it issued
eleven warrants, including two for former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and
Roh Tae Woo. 67 However, as the commission had no strong enforcement
tools, none of the eleven warrants was carried out. 168 For their refusal to
cooperate, former presidents Chun and Roh were fined 10 million won
(8,800 USD) and 7 million won (5,800 USD), respectively. 169
The final report, which covered the commission's first term activities,
was published in 2002.170 The report consisted of four volumes comprising
over 3,000 pages. The first volume analyzed the overall causes of suspi-
cious deaths and made policy recommendations, while the three other
volumes focused on the eighty-five individual cases. The commission also
published a second report on its second term activities in two volumes com-
prising over 1,300 pages.' 7' In sum, the commission found two key causes
of the suspicious deaths that occurred during the authoritarian regimes.
First, state power was misused to protect and prolong the regime rather than
to serve the public good. 172 Second, government bodies responsible for
monitoring and protecting the citizens' basic political and civil rights not
only failed to fulfill their mission, but also acquiesced in government
abuses and were even involved in concealing, distorting, and manipulating
the truth related to suspicious deaths. 73
Based on the findings and conclusions drawn from individual cases,
the commission made three sets of policy recommendations to the presi-
dent. 174 The first set included recommendations to continue efforts at find-
ing the truth about suspicious deaths, issuing government and individual
apologies to victims and the general public, prosecuting identified perpetra-
tors, restoring the honor of victims by the annulment of convictions, launch-
ing commemoration projects such as a memorial park and a museum
dedicated to the victims, and prohibiting the destruction of the government
165. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: SECOND TERM, supra note 153, at 143-44.
166. Suspicious Deaths Act, supra note 149, art. 22.
167. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: FIRST TERM, supra note 155, at 220-21.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: SECOND TERM, supra note 153.
172. Suspicious DEATHS REPORT: FIRST TERM, supra note 155.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 145.
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records used by the commission. 175 In the second set, the commission docu-
mented the suffering of the bereaved family members in detail and recom-
mended making significant reparations to the victims and their family
members. 176 In particular, the commission recommended that the state make
reparations to all the members of bereaved families, expressing state re-
sponsibility by enacting a special act. 177 Such reparation, the commission
concluded, should come in the form not only of lump-sum cash, but also of
pensions or other benefits in accessing government medical, educational, or
vocational services. 178 In the third set, the commission recommended spe-
cific reforms to the government structure in order to prevent future abuse of
state power. These included reform of the criminal justice and prosecution
system, the practices of the intelligence services, and laws governing the
activity and the structure of the military. 179
Between 2004 and 2006 several other commissions were established to
investigate human rights abuses under the military and authoritarian re-
gimes. The police, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Intelligence
Service (formerly known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) estab-
lished commissions in 2004 and 2005 to investigate past human rights vio-
lations and suspicious deaths.180 In 2005, the TRCK was likewise mandated
to investigate the remaining cases of suspicious deaths and disappearances
and other cases of systematic human rights violations that occurred under
the military and authoritarian regimes. 8' In 2006, an additional special
commission was created to investigate suspicious deaths within the military
itself, and it confirmed 246 more death cases. 182
175. Id. at 148-57.
176. Id. at 173-83.
177. Id. at 176, 181.
178. Id. at 179.
179. Id. at 183-209.
180. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 12-13. For more details, see
Ahn Kim Jeong Ae, Gukga Gigwan-eui Minjuhwa-wa Guageosa Cheongsan [Democ-
ratization of Government Bodies and Transitional Justice], 93 YEOKSA BIPYEONG
[CRITICAL REVIEW OF KOREAN HISTORY] 142-64 (2010).
181. The Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconcilia-
tion, Act. No. 7542, art. 2.5, May 31, 2005 [hereinafter Framework Act], translation
available at http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Information/legal/read.asp?num=76&
pageno= I &stype=&sval=&data years=2012&datamonth=.
182. The Truth Commission on Military Suspicious Deaths was created by the
Special Act for the Investigation of Military Suspicious Deaths, Act. No. 7626 (2005)
(S. Kor.).
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E. A Comprehensive Mandate
While the majority of truth commissions in South Korea were created
under special statutes focused on discrete incidents or events, the TRCK
was created with a much more comprehensive mandate. 183 It had the man-
date to investigate and reveal the truth not only about past human rights
abuses, violence, and massacres but also about more general history since
1910.184 Its enabling act, the 2005 Framework Act on Clearing Up Past
Events for Truth and Reconciliation, aimed thereby to enhance state legiti-
macy, reconcile South Korea with its past, and help the country achieve
national unity by honoring those who participated in the independence
movements. 85 The act stipulated five main categories of investigation: do-
mestic independence movements under Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945);
overseas independence movements during the same period or cases that en-
hanced the national prestige; civilian massacres from independence (1945)
through the Korean War (1950-1953); human rights violations by the state
since independence, especially under the military and authoritarian regimes
(1961-1992); and human rights abuses, violence, massacres, terrorism, and
suspicious deaths perpetrated by the enemies of the state (1961-1995).186
Although victims of the Korean War massacres led the transitional justice
movement to establish the TRCK, 187 the ruling National Congress for New
Politics party had to include additional categories of investigation to the
framing act, such as crimes committed by enemies of the state or enhance-
ment of national prestige, in the course of negotiation with the opposition
Grand National Party.188
The TRCK was mandated to investigate, at the request of victims and
their family members, individual cases of human rights violations. 89 It had
a four-year tenure, with a possible extension for two more years. 90 It had
two key functions: first, to screen individual applications for further investi-
gation, officially investigate the cases, and make decisions; and second, to
recommend reconciliatory policies to relevant government branches and
agencies and help establish further research institutes addressing past his-
tory. 191 The commission was an independent body composed of fifteen
183. Framework Act, supra note 181.
184. Id. art. 2.
185. Id. art. 1.
186. Id. art. 2
187. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 16.
188. Id. at 19.
189. See Framework Act, supra note 181, art. 19.
190. Id. art. 25.
191. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 38, 40.
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commissioners; eight who were appointed by the National Assembly, four
by the president, and three by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. 192 The
commission has had three presidents: Song Gi Yin, a Catholic priest (2005-
2007), Ahn Byung Wook, a professor of Korean history at the Catholic
University of Korea (2007-2009), and Lee Young Jo, a professor of politi-
cal science (2009-2010). For four and a half years, the commission had
around 240 residing staff members and a total annual budget of 76 billion
won (63.3 million USD). 193
The commission worked in three subcommittees, thirteen investigation
teams, and employed 157 investigators: the Subcommittee of Investigation
on National Independence (3 teams with 39 investigators), the Subcommit-
tee of Investigation on Mass Civilian Sacrifices (5 teams with 66 investiga-
tors), and the Subcommittee of Investigation on Human Rights Abuses (5
teams with 42 investigators). 94 Out of the 11,174 applications the commis-
sion received, 290 cases were related to the independence movement, 8,175
to civilian massacres, and 2,709 to human rights abuses either by the state
or the state's enemies. 195 By September 2010, the commission investigated
all cases, confirming the facts of 8,468 cases and rejecting 1,729 cases.196
The most important category of investigation was represented by the civil-
ian massacres during the early years of state-building, which constituted
seventy-five percent of total applications. The commission could request
secret files from relevant government agencies; conduct interviews with rel-
evant victims, witnesses and perpetrators; and issue a warrant to call wit-
nesses for an interview and investigation. 197 However, the warrant lacked
strong enforcement mechanisms, with only a fine not exceeding 10 million
won for noncompliance (8,800 USD). 198
Since 2006, the commission has published seven interim reports, two
per year, and widely distributed them to the National Assembly, govern-
ment offices, human rights organizations, and libraries. 199 The final report
comprised four volumes of over 1,100 pages in total, was released in De-
cember 2010, and included an overall analysis of human rights violations
and the details of individual cases. 200 The commission attributed eighty-two
percent of the 9,609 petitions regarding wartime massacres to state agents
192. Framework Act, supra note 181, art. 4.
193. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 58.
194. Id. at 50-54.
195. Id. at 32.
196. Id.
197. See Framework Act, supra note 181, arts. 23-24.
198. See id. art. 47.
199. See id. art. 32.
200. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12.
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(the police, the military and rightist groups associated with the state) and
only eighteen percent to the North Korean military and leftist groups. 201 The
commission identified several patterns of massacres: nationwide preventive
detentions and summary executions of former communists and their sup-
porters immediately after the outbreak of war; retaliation against alleged
communist collaborators with the North Korean occupational force; killings
of civilians during the rooting-out of communist guerrillas during and after
the war in the southern provinces of Jeolla and Gyeongsang; killings of
civilians by indiscriminate U.S bombings; and nationwide massacres of ci-
vilians suspected of being communists or having family members with such
an ideological disposition.20 2
III. TRUTH COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS: LESSONS
FOR IMPLEMENTATION
By 2012, the major activities of the various truth commissions have
reached an effective end, leaving a multitude of policy recommendations
behind for implementation by the South Korean state and broader civil soci-
ety. While it is recognized that the process of implementing truth commis-
sion recommendations can be a long and politically complex one, are there
lessons that can be drawn from South Korea's experiences with earlier com-
missions? This part analyzes two of South Korea's most prominent truth-
seeking efforts - the Jeju Commission (2000-current) and the TRCK (2005-
2010) - in an effort to identify factors that can facilitate the successful im-
plementation of truth commission recommendations. These commissions
are chosen not only for the many similarities they share in terms of the
work environments they encountered, 203 but primarily because the recom-
201. Id. at 32.
202. See generally id.
203. There is a close parallel between the Jeju Commission and the TRCK. First,
both commissions are mandated to investigate mainly atrocities that occurred between
1945 and 1954. The implication, first of all, is that most of the key witnesses are already
dead or are too old to give testimony. In addition, most of the key documents have been
either destroyed or lost by the time of investigation, with many critical documents sys-
tematically destroyed under the military regimes. Second, the most frequent form of
human rights violations was personal integrity rights violations, more precisely, mas-
sacres and disappearances. Third, both cases involved ideologically controversial issues
because the previous anticommunist regimes suppressed truth, painted the victims as
communists, and justified the crime of the military and police. Both commissions met
with strong resistance from the conservative and anticommunist wing of the society,
especially from the military and police. These challenges existed before, during, and
after the commission activities, and in both commissions, attack came from both inside
and outside.
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mendations of the Jeju Commission have been particularly well imple-
mented, while those of the TRCK appear to be faring less well.
Although we have to bear in mind that the Jeju Commission released
its report containing policy recommendations for the government a full
seven years earlier than the TRCK (2003 and 2010, respectively), the suc-
cessful implementation of the Jeju Commission's recommendations and the
comparable lack of progress in implementing the TRCK recommendations
is noteworthy. 204 What accounts for this difference? This section will re-
view several reasons that have been offered, although none of them appear
to satisfactorily explain this difference. Without a proper understanding of
this question, it is difficult to determine how the Jeju Commission's success
in terms of implementing its recommendations might inform the implemen-
tation process of the TRCK recommendations and lead to successful
outcomes.
The Jeju Commission offered seven recommendations: (1) the issu-
ance of an apology; (2) the declaration of a memorial day; (3) the use of the
report to educate students and the general public; (4) the establishment of a
memorial park; (5) the provision of essential living expenses to bereaved
families; (6) support for excavations of mass graves; and (7) continuous
support for further investigation and commemoration projects. 20 5 With the
exception of declaring a memorial day, the government has started to im-
plement all of these recommendations. 20 6
Immediately after the release of the report in 2003, President Roh Moo
Hyun made an official apology to the victims, families, and Jeju island-
ers.20 7 President Roh stated:
As the president, who is responsible for state affairs, I truly give you
my apology and words of consolation for the wrongdoings of past
national authorities .... The government will create an April 3 Peace
Park and actively support suggestions made by the April 3 Truth Ex-
amination Committee, including swift recovery of the honor of those
killed .... Now is the time to close the chapters of the unfortunate
204. Suh Joong Seok also evaluates the Jeju Commission's activities as "relatively
successful." See Joong Seok Suh, Guageosa Jinsang Gyumeong-eui Jeomgeomgua Hy-
anghu Gwaje [Revisiting the Truth-Seeking Efforts on the Past History and Remaining
Tasks], 80 YEOKSA BIPYEONG [CRITICAL REVIEW OF KOREAN HISTORY] 73 (2007).
205. JEJU COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, at 112.
206. The commission recommended declaring a memorial day in order to appease
the souls of the dead and make the past atrocities a lesson for the future. The adminis-
tration was cautious in implementing this recommendation because forty-two memorial
days had already been declared and a decision on forty-five other proposed commemo-
ration days was still pending. Id. at 114.
207. Id. at 117-21.
[Vol. 19
Trial and Error
events that took place here in the process of establishing the govern-
ment in post-independence days, and to go forward .... We must put
an end to all conflicts on this land through reconciliation and cooper-
ation for peace on the Korean Peninsula to open a road to Northeast
Asia and globalism. 208
This was significant in that it marked the first apology issued by a head
of state in Korea regarding human rights violations caused by state vio-
lence.20 9 Moreover, in 2006, President Roh visited Jeju Island to participate
in a memorial service for the victims, at which time he issued another apol-
ogy. 210 Thus, the first recommendation was implemented swiftly, paving the
way for the implementation of the remaining policy recommendations.
In addition, the narratives and descriptions in government documents
and high school history textbooks have changed since the release of the
report. Most textbooks have departed from the previous characterization of
the Jeju events as a communist rebellion and moved toward a more bal-
anced description of the armed uprising and civilian sacrifices. 211 The mili-
tary has likewise changed its description of the Jeju events, albeit under
significant public pressure. In 2004, for example, immediately after the re-
lease of the report, the military published and released the 2004 edition of
The History of 6.25, describing the Jeju 4.3 events using the traditional an-
ticommunist view while ignoring the findings of the Jeju Commission.2 12
Although researchers and journalists had discovered several new facts in
the 1990s, none of these new developments were reflected in the book,
which suffered from obvious errors. In response, victims and activists or-
ganized rallies and local lawmakers demanded an apology from the minister
of defense urging him to discontinue the release of the book.213 Due to the
pressure from civil society, the military eventually decided to discontinue
the publication of the book, promising to revise it to reflect the findings of
the Jeju Commission. 214
A minimum level of monetary subsidy was also selectively given to
the victims of Jeju and their family members who had suffered economic
hardship and physical and mental illness.21 1 In accordance with its recom-
208. Official Apology Issued for Jeju Killings, THE CHOSWN ILBO, (S.Kor.), Oct.
31, 2003.
209. JEJU COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, at 117.
210. Id. at 302.
211. Id. at 114-15.
212. Ho Jin Kang, Distortion of 4.3, THE JEMIN DAILY (S. Kor.), Jul. 10, 2004.
213. Ho Joon Huh, 'Distortion of 4.3' Demand for the apology, THE HANKYOREH
(S. Kor.), July, 16 2004.
214. Suh, supra note 204, at 62; Huh, supra note 213.
215. JEu COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, at 115.
2012]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
mendations, the Jeju Commission has likewise been engaged in three com-
memoration projects. The earliest commemoration project was mainly
focused on creating the Jeju Peace Memorial Park and Museum. However,
both victims and activists saw the limitations of these projects and thus
pushed for a major revision of the special act in 2007 to include further
commemoration activities, specifically through the establishment of a per-
manent Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation. 2 16 The Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation was
created to promote peace and human rights by, first, maintaining the Jeju
4.3 Museum and Memorial Park, and second, conducting additional investi-
gations. 217 At the same time, the commission launched a long-term excava-
tion project in 2006 to discover mass graves and find the remains of
victims.2 18 By 2010, eight out of 151 mass murder sites were unearthed, and
the remains of over 400 victims have been discovered so far.219 Recently,
the Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation launched a project headed by Park Chan Sik,
a long-time researcher and activist of the Jeju 4.3 events, to further investi-
gate the conflict and massacres. 220
The TRCK recommendations, by contrast, have fared less well. 22 1 Al-
though the TRCK's final report was released only in December 2010, the
TRCK had by then already published seven interim reports, including rec-
ommendations on individual cases since 2006.222 These recommendations
were different in nature from the general policy recommendations made by
the Jeju Commission, as they were made on individual cases already con-
firmed by the TRCK. Thus, by June 30, 2010, the TRCK had announced
855 recommendations on individual cases. 223 Most recommendations -
about 74 percent of the total - were made to the military and police. 224
To monitor the implementation process, the government set up the
Recommendations Follow-Up Board (Board) under the Office of the Prime
Minister in 2007, a body later incorporated into the Ministry of Public Ad-
216. Id. at 116.
217. Id. at 311.
218. Id. at 115-16.
219. Id. at 275-76.
220. Hye Ah Ko, Launching a Follow-up Investigation on the Jeju 4.3 Events,
THE JEMIN DAILY (S. Kor.), Feb. 10, 2012.
221. In 2009, the Hankyoreh, a progressive newspaper, reported that among
twenty-seven policy recommendations of the TRCK regarding the victims of civilian
massacres, half of them have not even begun to be implemented. See Kil & Kwon,
supra note 15.
222. These recommendations were made available on the TRCK's official web-
site, http://www.jinsil.go.kr (accessed on 2 May 2012).
223. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12.
224. Id. at 202.
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ministration and Security in 2008.225 According to the TRCK's report, the
TRCK and the Board worked closely together: The TRCK delivered the
policy recommendations on individual cases to the Board and the Board
requested relevant ministers to draft detailed implementation plans. In turn,
ministers were to report back to the Board every quarter on the progress
made on those plans, with the Board reporting back to the TRCK biannu-
ally. 226 The recommendations are divided into four categories: (1) measures
to restore the honor of victims; (2) measures to prevent the recurrence of
human rights violations; (3) measures to achieve reconciliation and to pro-
mote democracy; and (4) measures to educate about and publicize the
past.227 Specific recommendations included apology, correction of govern-
ment records, revision of textbooks and government documents, legislation
and revision of the relevant laws, human rights education, support for me-
morial projects, reparations, and retrials for those who were falsely
convicted. 228
The TRCK recommended the government apologize for 179 human
rights violations cases and, as of 2010, fifty-two official apologies had been
issued. 229 Such apologies were, however, issued mostly by local police
chiefs and low-profile military commanders. Furthermore, most apologies
were not apologies in a strict sense 23 0 as most merely expressed officials'
"regrets" or "condolences" while delivering an address at a memorial ser-
vice.231 More recently, the military and police have stopped delivering ad-
dresses altogether, claiming that the simple presence of military and police
officers at memorial services is sufficient. 232 The only exception to this
trend has been President Roh Moo Hyun's apology to the victims of civilian
massacres during the Korean War. However, even this message was not
225. It was set up by the Regulations on the Establishment and Operation of the
Recommendations Follow-Up Board (Presidential Directive No. 195) (S. Kor.), (2007);
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES OF THE PAST THREE
YEARS (2009) [hereinafter TRCK THREE YEARS REPORT]. For more details, see Kim
Dong-Choon, Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: An Overview and Assess-
ment, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97 (2012).
226. TRCK THREE YEARS REPORT, supra note 225, at 33; see also FINAL TRCK
REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 119-200.
227. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, 201.
228. See generally id. at 205-17.
229. Id. at 203.
230. Editorial, Is Government going to make the effort of the TRCK in vain?, THE
HANKYOREH, Sept. 7, 2009..
231. Kil & Kwon, supra note 15.
232. Id.
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delivered in person, as was done in the Jeju case, but rather via a videotaped
message.
233
As for retrials, the TRCK recommended retrials in forty-two cases,
with eighteen victims having cleared their names of false convictions by
June 2010.234 In addition, several individual victims filed lawsuits against
the government for reparations, and some have been successful in recover-
ing very large damages awards.235 Overall implementation of the individual
recommendations has thus been reported to be quite good: according to the
TRCK's final report, 361 out of 855 recommendations (42 percent) were
implemented. 236 However, a closer look reveals that almost half of imple-
mented recommendations involved measures that required very little effort,
such as placing the TRCK's report in government offices (117 cases), or
supporting and participating in memorial services (55 cases).237 The Hanky-
oreh, a progressive newspaper, has referred to these efforts as the "least
expensive or least controversial" measures.
238
The picture becomes even gloomier when we consider the final and
comprehensive policy recommendations the TRCK made to the government
in 2009. The TRCK made three policy recommendations in August and
October of 2009.239 First, the TRCK recommended the government and Na-
tional Assembly enact a special law to make reparations available for the
victims of civilian massacres during the Korean War. Second, the commis-
sion recommended the government establish a permanent research founda-
tion in order to continue the investigative work of the TRCK and promote
reconciliation. Finally, the commission recommended that the government
continue to unearth mass murder sites and collect and properly bury the
remains of victims. Unfortunately, none of these three key policy recom-
mendations have been implemented as of May 2012. The prospect for the
future implementation of these recommendations is not bright either.240
Upon the TRCK's announcement of a plan to create a permanent research
foundation, for example, the conservative wing of Korean society vehe-
mently attacked the commission. Major conservative newspapers criticized
233. TRCK THREE YEARS REPORT, supra note 225, at 107.
234. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 192.
235. See Kim, supra note 225; Tae-Ung Baik, Fairness in Transitional Justice
Initiatives: The Case of South Korea, 19 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 169 (2012).
236. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 203.
237. Id.
238. Kil & Kwon, supra note 15.
239. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 211.
240. Jung, supra note 13; Kil & Kwon, supra note 15; Lee, supra note 15.
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it for "trying to extend [its] work under [a] new title" 241 and impugned com-
missioners and staff as "people who are trying to benefit from the research
foundation with taxpayer money worth 800 billion won. '242
What accounts for the differences between the Jeju Commission and
the TRCK with respect to implementing recommendations? Commentators
have offered several explanations, none of which appear satisfactory when
considered in light of the experience of the Jeju Commission. These expla-
nations focus on the built-in weaknesses and limitations of the TRCK,
which, it is argued, hindered the TRCK's work and eventually obstructed
the implementation of its policy recommendations.
The first explanation offered is that the framework law creating the
TRCK was a result of political compromise, thereby creating innate con-
straints for the TRCK. 243 According to this claim, the conservative party
tried to weaken the TRCK in the first place by failing to give it sufficient
power.244 Yet, a similar political settlement underlies the special law creat-
ing the Jeju Commission. Although victims and activists demanded that the
Jeju Commission be granted more powers to enhance its effectiveness, such
as the powers to search and seize, to issue warrants, or to request retrials,
none of these were adopted in the final bill. In addition, the Jeju Commis-
sion faced several crises and challenges throughout its tenure. Opponents,
mainly retired military and police personnel and conservative elites and or-
ganizations, attempted to frustrate the activities and accomplishments of the
commission from the start. The most important challenge to the Jeju com-
mission's work involved legal appeals to the Constitutional Court against
its framework act (in 2000), its official report (2004), and the president's
apology (2004).245 Although the court dismissed them all, these appeals had
an important negative and constraining impact on the activities of the
commission.
Second, TRCK commissioners and investigators often complained
that, although the TRCK was empowered to request access to government
files, the TRCK did not have any enforcement power when the government
241. Editorial, Who benefits from the research foundation, THE KUKMIN ILBO (S.
Kor.), May 18, 2009.
242. Editorial, People trying to benefit from the research foundation with 800 bil-
lion won, THE DONGA ILBO (S. Kor.), May 18, 2009.
243. Kim, The Long Road, supra note 7, at 548; Kim, supra note 225; Keun-Sik
Jung,, Institutionalization of Social Movements for the Truth of Civilian Massacres and
Its Prospects, I GENOCIDE YEONGU [STUDY OF GENOCIDE] 26 (2007).
244. Kim, supra note 225.
245. JEJU COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, 123-25. For the Constitu-
tional Court's decisions, see 2009 Hun-Ma 238 (2001); 2000 Hun-Ma 509 (2003); and
2004 Hun-Ma 577 (2004).
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branches or organizations rejected such requests.2 46 While this certainly im-
posed a serious constraint, the Jeju Commission faced precisely the same
problem. 247 In fact, the TRCK was more powerful than the Jeju Commis-
sion in that it had the power to issue warrants and fines if a person failed to
comply with its requests. 248 The Jeju Commission, by contrast, did not have
this power. As TRCK former standing commissioner, Kim Dong-Choon,
explained in a media interview, the TRCK was likewise more advanced
than the Presidential Commission on Suspicious Deaths given that the
TRCK, if denied access to any information requested, had the power to
request an explanation for the denial from the head of the institution. 249
Moreover, one of many advantages of the TRCK was that it had more
resources than the Jeju Commission. The TRCK had a total annual budget
of 76 billion won and employed approximately 240 residing staff, including
147 investigators. 250 By contrast, the Jeju Commission spent less than 10
billion won and employed a mere sixty residing staff, including twenty in-
vestigators. 251 In other words, the TRCK operated with a budget and per-
sonnel seven times greater than the Jeju Commission. Even so, it often
failed to operate effectively as a team. Conservative critics, including for-
mer TRCK president Lee Young Jo, have repeatedly pointed out the ineffi-
ciency of the large organization. 252
It may be said that the TRCK's huge organizational structure and re-
sources were necessary given its comprehensive investigative mandate. It
might also be said that the Jeju case was better off since the events investi-
gated were confined to a single island. This is true and certainly promoted
unity in terms of how civil society organized to respond to controversies. 253
It does not nevertheless mean that the issues addressed were any less com-
plicated that those addressed by the TRCK. In particular, although the ma-
jor events occurred in Jeju, prisoners were transferred to the mainland and
the Korean War broke out in the course of the Jeju events. Moreover, since
246. Kim, The Long Road, supra note 7, at 546; Kim, supra note 225; Jung, supra
note 243, at 27.
247. JEJU COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, at 73.
248. See Framework Act, supra note 181, arts. 45, 47.
249. Jae Jung Kim, supra note 10, at 44.
250. FINAL TRCK REPORT 2010, supra note 12, at 51, 58.
251. JEJU COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 89, at 60-66.
252. See, e.g., Lee, Commissioning the Past, supra note 4, at 16; Mun-myeong
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the number of victims was larger than in other single event cases, the resis-
tance from the military and police was particularly severe and well
organized. 254
The third claim is the strongest. It argues that the TRCK's effective-
ness was fundamentally undermined by the changing political context. Spe-
cifically, while the TRCK started its work under the Roh Moo Hyun
administration, which fully supported the commission's activities, it fin-
ished under the current Lee Myung Bak administration, which has effec-
tively denied the commission's core value. 255 In particular, President Lee
has emphasized the importance of economic development and looking-for-
ward rather than wasting money looking backward and unearthing past
atrocities.2 5 6 The effectiveness of the TRCK's activities was particularly
compromised, it is said, by President Lee's nomination of a new TRCK
president, Lee Young Jo, and other commissioners who were less enthusias-
tic about past truth commission activities. There is certainly some truth to
this, as state officials became uncooperative with TRCK requests after the
victory of Lee Myung Bak, not only in the military and police but also in
other government offices. 257 At the same time, the TRCK had its budget for
the last year cut significantly by the government and congress 258 and, al-
though the TRCK had a right to request an extension of its mandate for up
to two years, its new president Lee Young Jo requested only two months
and hurriedly closed down the TRCK.259
Nevertheless, I do not consider this the critical cause of the commis-
sion's inability to implement its recommendations. There are two reasons.
First, the TRCK operated for two years under the Roh administration and
another two years under the Lee administration. The Jeju Commission had a
two-year mandate, and almost every truth commission around the world
254. Id. at 63.
255. Kim, supra note 225; Truth committees face uncertain fate: National Assem-
bly is likely to abolish, merge, or limit their activities,THE HANKYOREH (S. Kor.), Sept.
4, 2008; Kim Dong-choon & Mark Selden, South Korea's Embattled Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission, JAPAN Focus, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Kim-Dong-choon/
3313 (accessed on May 9, 2012).
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ceases operation within two years.260 In a sense, then, the TRCK operated
over a longer period than average commissions and had two full years
under the highly supportive Roh administration.
261
Second, the Jeju Commission continued to operate successfully even
under the current Lee administration. In 2008 it published a white paper on
its activities and in January 2012 conducted its 16th plenary session, decid-
ing on 4,000 more victims and approving 12 billion won for commemora-
tion projects.2 62 At the same time, the new administration attempted to
merge the Jeju Commission with the TRCK, but was unsuccessful, largely
because of strong resistance from Jeju victims and civil society more
broadly. 263 Thus, simply saying that the TRCK's activities have been frus-
trated by the new administration is not convincing.
It is noteworthy that many political analysts predicted the win of the
conservative candidate in the 2007 election. There were thus three critical
things that the TRCK could have done during the window of opportunity
between 2005 and 2007 when the Roh government was in place. First, its
commissioners could have started to push early on for the creation of a
permanent memorial and research foundation, for which the framework act
provides explicit authority. 264 Second, based on the work of the Jeju Com-
mission, the TRCK commissioners were already aware of the importance of
creating a data archive.265 Indeed, the Jeju Commission had systematically
organized the data it collected during the first year and published it as an
eleven-volume archive to enable scholars and researchers to continue to in-
vestigate simultaneously. The TRCK could have, but did not do this. As
Kim Jong Min who worked in the Jeju Commission has pointed out, docu-
ments and interview scripts were not systematically organized and managed
in the TRCK.266 Third, if the commissioners knew that four years was not
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enough time to complete its mandate, they could have pursued the revision
of the framework act to explicitly stipulate an extended term for the com-
mission. Given that the Jeju Commission successfully pursued all of these
options, the TRCK could have increased its effectiveness by following its
example.
A more fundamental reason must, then, be sought to account for the
different levels of implementation between the Jeju Commission's recom-
mendations and those of the TRCK. A key reason, I contend, involves the
different kinds of "truth" pursued by the two commissions. Truth commis-
sions are created to investigate the truth. However, there are different no-
tions of truth: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social or
"dialogue" truth, and healing and restorative truth.267 The South Korean
TRCK, despite being modeled after the South African commission, was
designed to focus on the factual or forensic truth of individual cases only. 268
The process followed by the TRCK involved three steps: an individual vic-
tim submits an application, an individual investigator examines the case,
and the commissioners take a final decision on the truth of that case. This
approach is different from the Jeju Commission, which decided to work
together as a team to create a comprehensive and historical truth about the
civilian massacres in addition to the individual truths of particular cases. 269
First debated within the special investigation unit, headed by Park Won
Soon, a renowned human rights lawyer, this approach was later approved
by the full Jeju Commission.270
The Jeju Commission's final report thus had a single historical story to
tell to society, while the TRCK report on individual cases lacked that
master narrative. For the TRCK, every truth existed as a set of defrag-
mented facts, without a strong narrative that organically connected the indi-
vidual cases. 271 In order to have an impact on society as a whole, individual
truth and comprehensive truth must be combined.27 2 As one commentator
who closely followed the activity of the TRCK lamented, "Last week's
government admission to the massacre did not make much impact. The
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story was tucked away on the inside pages [of Korean newspapers] and
passed most people by." 273 Suh Joong Seok likewise observed the lukewarm
reaction in the general public to what was otherwise "world-shaking mega-
scale news. '274 The former president of the TRCK Lee Young Jo made a
similar observation in referring to the TRCK's individualistic approach as a
"micro-approach" in contrast to a historically-oriented "macro-
approach. 275
In these cases [of mass civilian killings before and during the Korean
War], a macro-approach would have served the purpose better. The
macro truth could be relatively easily verified. With documentary ev-
idence and oral witnesses, the investigators could easily tell whether,
when, where, how, and perhaps by whom these killings were com-
mitted .... But often times it [the micro-approach] hindered recon-
structing the whole picture and drawing out the significance of the
incidents by forcing the investigators to look through small
window[s] .276
Kim Jong Min's observation is particularly informative. He has argued
that different investigators separately investigated massacres committed by
the same military unit and thus each investigator was not able to "see the
wood for the trees. '277 Because every case was treated as an individual
case, he has argued, the TRCK was not able to reveal the chain of command
on what apparently were nationwide and systematic massacres. 278
This failure, I believe, constitutes the fundamental difference between
the Jeju Commission and the TRCK, explaining why their respective rec-
ommendations have been implemented to different degrees. Individual truth
is the initial step to achieve the comprehensive and holistic truth. 279 As a
basic building block, it is a necessary element, but it is not a sufficient one.
That is, the mere "collection" or "sum" of individual truths is not the
equivalent of the comprehensive truth. 280 To achieve its objectives, and to
have a larger impact on society, the TRCK should have pursued another
stream of investigations to reveal the historical and political structures that
allowed past violence to perpetuate, the political, social, and ideological
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contexts in which the violence took place, and the chain of command in
ordering massacres and other gross human rights violations.281
IV. CONCLUSION
As many scholars and practitioners have already noted, it is extremely
unlikely that another truth commission in South Korea will be established in
the near future. 28 2 The prospect is even more discouraging if Park Geun
Hye, a leader of the conservative Saenuri Party and daughter of Park Chung
Hee (who regarded the TRCK's finding as a "personal offensive" against
her),283 wins the presidential election in December 2012. Most of Park's
supporters in conservative political groups believe the activities of the
TRCK are little more than "score-settling" by leftists.28 4 What should then
be the goal of the next truth and reconciliation movement? Fortunately, the
TRCK left us with three practical policy recommendations that can be pur-
sued: (1) enactment of a reparations law, (2) creation of a permanent re-
search foundation, and (3) a continuation of excavation projects. Among
these three recommendations, the most important for victims and activists
to focus on, I strongly believe, is the establishment of a research foundation.
Indeed, a key difference between the Jeju Commission and the TRCK
is the latter's failure to create the permanent memorial and research founda-
tion stipulated in the Framing Act.285 The TRCK attempted to do so, but its
efforts have come primarily after the inauguration of Lee Myung Bak and
have been effectively blocked by conservatives. 286 This should not, how-
ever, justify failure to continue such efforts. In the Jeju case, activists and
victims struggled for over eight years to revise the special act creating the
Jeju commission to incorporate a provision on the establishment of a per-
manent research foundation, and eventually created the foundation.287 The
importance of having a permanent institution in place cannot be overstated.
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Through a research and memorial foundation, other critical projects such as
the enactment of a comprehensive reparations law and a continuation of
excavations can be initiated. At the same time, through the continuation of
truth-seeking efforts, the research and memorial foundation can better lay
the foundation for the long-term goals of reconciliation and the achieve-
ment of historical, political, and legal justice. 288 A truth commission is only
a temporary organization; its work and legacy can and must be continued in
a permanent institution.
The creation of a permanent research foundation is highly feasible for
a number of reasons. First, there is a group of activists, researchers, and
victims who strongly believe that the work of the TRCK remains unfin-
ished.289 These groups are well-positioned to take the initiative to push gov-
ernment to create the research foundation and to implement the rest of the
TRCK's policy recommendations. 290 Recently, for example, activists and
former TRCK staff members created the Forum on Truth and Justice to
continue the legacy of the TRCK by continuing its investigative work.2 9'
More of these civil society movements will work positively for the creation
of a permanent research foundation.
Second, Korean scholars, particularly in the field of history, are paying
more and more attention to contemporary Korean history due to the work of
the TRCK.292 Topics that were once forbidden in academia are now rela-
tively freely discussed among a new generation of scholars. 293 Suh Joong
Seok, a progressive historian, sees two reasons for this. First, the documents
and interviews collected by the various truth commissions have become an
important resource for research. Second, Suh thinks the commissions' deci-
sions can now serve as a yardstick to evaluate past and future research.
There is great potential here for future development, enhancing the possibil-
ity that academia and civil society will work together to continue the legacy
of the TRCK.
Finally, the TRCK's work is increasingly well known in international
scholarship. 294 The number of English-language journal articles, special is-
sues like this one, and monographs on the South Korean TRCK are ex-
panding, and more and more scholars are paying attention to the South
Korean truth commission experience. The controversies caused by the
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TRCK's last president Lee Young Jo's decision to stop the distribution of
an English-language report due to alleged translation errors is already well-
known among international scholars.2 95 The decision was more shocking
still since Lee Young Jo clearly said in a newspaper interview that "We [the
TRCK] plan to hold an international forum sometime in the latter half of the
year to share with the world our achievements. '296 The continued efforts in
international scholarship to study the South Korean experience can likewise
facilitate and stimulate domestic scholarship and research.
The work of any truth commission does not end with the mere comple-
tion of its mandate. Rather, that end is simply another beginning, as we
have seen in many international and domestic examples. Continuing truth
and reconciliation work is especially important in the context of the Korean
peninsula given that revisiting the past will be a major issue when the North
and South begin to discuss the possibility of reunification. The experience
of the various truth commissions in South Korea will provide valuable les-
sons for the inter-Korean dialogue, aiming at peace, democracy, and human
rights.
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